Abstract:What is progress and what is not progress? We can talk about progress in lots of different arenas; we will focus primarily on economic and scientific progress, but also make brief reference to cultural and moral progress. In our discussion, we want to distinguish, especially, between overall, long-term progress and narrower, shorter-term progress or regress. We will refer to these as “global” and “local” progress, respectively. Of course, one can also regress; therefore, we will also look at instances where progress, (...) along some dimension, slows or even moves backwards. Generally, such regress is local, and often still in a context of broader, global progress. In scientific progress, for example, there are many instances of short-term progress which, if not completely discarded or disproved, are at least substantially modified or fundamentally challenged. And yet, those research paths, even when later abandoned, still contributed to the overall progress of the field. In that sense, the regress (that is, rejection or modification of previous theories) is corrected by, but not in conflict with, the overall progress. In the case of economic progress, the concept of regress usually takes on a different form in which things that aren’t advancing progress don’t necessarily stop it, but are simply retarding progress — that is, making the rate of progress less efficient. The consequence, we suggest, is that when talking about economic progress, objections to certain consequences of economic progress (for instance, income inequality — a type of regress, in our terminology) should not be cordoned off and dealt with independently, but should be incorporated into the way we think about economic progress itself — as instances of local regress within a context of global progress. We explore the effects of these different relations between progress and regress to suggest some of the challenges those seeking to broaden the standard measure, GDP, to incorporate other social values of well-being will face moving forward. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:DID AQUINAS CHANGE HIS MIND ABOUT THE WILL? DANIEL WESTBERG University of Virginia Charlottesville, Virginia 0 NE OF THE MOST fundamental and challenging problems in the interpretation of St. Thomas is the proper relationship of intellect and will, on which so much of moral theology (and thus of the Summa Theologiae) hinges. As Alasdair Macintyre indicates in both After Virtue and Whose Justice? Which Rationality? the problem involves (...) our understanding of how to appreciate the genius of Aquinas in the monumental task of harmonizing Aristotelian practical reason and the biblical and Augustinian categories of will, sin and the law of God. When this framework is brought to the reading of St. Thomas, it is very difficult to understand certain texts which can seem to be obscure or inconsistent. In some cases he seems to be following Aristotle's explanations of practical reason and choice, and elsewhere he emphasizes the freedom of the will. One method of dealing with this is to argue for a change in Thomas's thinking: that he shifted from an early emphasis on the intellect (his Aristotelian phase) to an appreciation for the dynamic freedom of the will (which he inherited and developed from the Augustinian tradition). This has the virtue of seeming to deal neatly with inconvenient texts by consigning them to a position which he abandoned; but as we shall see the treatments by Aquinas do not fit the chronology required by this schema of development. There is very little evidence, actually, to recommend this thesis ~even though it has been advocated by prominent scholars41 42 DANIEL WESTBERG and there are strong reasons why we should reject this theory of change. That this explanation has nevertheless been widely held says more about the tradition of voluntarism in our thinking (and our tendency to see Aquinas in that light) than about the merits of the case brought forward to argue for Thomas's shift from reason to will. Proponents of the Theory of Change Dom Odon Lattin questioned the dating of De Malo 6 to 126368 by Mandonnet (and ca. 1268 by Grabmann) on the basis that the work shows advances in the treatment of liberum arbitrium. He argued that whereas Thomas had placed the primary motive factor on reason in his earlier works 1 the emphasis was shifted to the will in De Malo 6 and ST I-II, q.9, a. 4. Therefore we could conclude that De Malo is posterior to ST I and anterior to ST I-II.2 Lottin was right about the dating, but not about the reasons given for it. He alleged that the structure of the argument in De Malo 6 is entirely different from previous treatments because the distinction between voluntas and liberum arbitrium has disappeared and been replaced by " liberty of specification " and "liberty of exercise." Lattin admitted, however, that the former belongs to reason and the latter to will implying (without realizing it, perhaps) that we might well interpret this as a change of terminology rather than a change of doctrine. Lottin softened his claims the following year in an article where he wrote: " ll ne faudrait pas urger la difference... qui eziste entre cet expose du De Malo et celui du De Veritate," admitting that the distinction between specification and exercise is also to be found in De Veritate. Therefore we should not speak "d'opposition ni meme de diversite de doctrine." 3 1 E.g. De Veritate 22.12; Summa contra Gentiles III, 89; ST I, q.82, a.4. 2 " La date de la Question Disputee De Malo de Saint Thomas d'Aquin," Revue d'histoire ecclesiastique 24 (1928) : 373-388. 3 0. Lottin, "Le libre arbitre chez saint Thomas d'Aquin," Revue thomiste 12 (1929): 424, n. 1; reprinted in vol. 1 of Psychologie et morale a=- Xlle et Xllle siecles (Gembloux, 1948). DID AQUINAS CHANGE HIS MIND 43 There is still a difference, however, in emphasis, Lottin argued, for two reasons: ( 1) In the De Malo a text from the Eudemian Ethics of Aristotle is quoted to indicate that God is the first mover of the will; this apparently undercuts the priority of the intellect over the will; Lottin... (shrink)

My paper provides reasons in support of the view that vague identity claims originate from a conflict between rigidity and precision in designation. To put this stricly, let x be the referent of the referential terms P and Q. Then, that the proposition “that any x being both a P and a Q” is vague involves that the semantic intuitions at work in P and Q reveal a conflict between P and Q being simultaneously rigid and precise designators. After having (...) shortly commented on an example of vague identity claim, I make the case for my proposal, by discussing how reference by baptism conflicts with descriptive attitudes towards understanding conceptual contents. (shrink)

A principle endorsed by many theories of objective chance, and practically forced on us by the standard interpretation of the Kolmogorov semantics for chance, is the principle that when a proposition P has a chance, any proposition Q that is necessarily equivalent to P will have the same chance as P. Call this principle SUB (for the substitution of necessary equivalents into chance ascriptions). I will present some problems for a theory of chance, and will argue that the best way (...) to resolve these problems is to reject SUB, and similar principles e.g. for the chances of outcomes or the chances of events. Objective chance, it turns out, carves things more finely than necessary equivalence does. (shrink)

On the Lockean thesis one ought to believe a proposition if and only if one assigns it a credence at or above a threshold (Foley in Am Philos Q 29(2):111–124, 1992). The Lockean thesis, thus, provides a way of characterizing sets of all-or-nothing beliefs. Here we give two independent characterizations of the sets of beliefs satisfying the Lockean thesis. One is in terms of betting dispositions associated with full beliefs and one is in terms of an accuracy scoring system for (...) full beliefs. These characterizations are parallel to, but not merely derivative from, the more familiar Dutch Book (de Finetti in Theory of probability, vol 1, Wiley, London, 1974) and accuracy (Joyce in Philos Sci 65(4):575–603, 1998) arguments for probabilism. (shrink)

We prove the following algebraic characterization of elementary equivalence: $\equiv$ restricted to countable structures of finite type is minimal among the equivalence relations, other than isomorphism, which are preserved under reduct and renaming and which have the Robinson property; the latter is a faithful adaptation for equivalence relations of the familiar model theoretical notion. We apply this result to Friedman's fourth problem by proving that if L = L ωω (Q i ) i ∈ ω 1 is an (ω 1 (...) , ω)-compact logic satisfying both the Robinson consistency theorem on countable structures of finite type and the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem for some $\lambda for theories having ω 1 many sentences, then $\equiv_L = \equiv$ on such structures. (shrink)

People tend to contribute more—and think they have stronger obligations to contribute more—to rescuing an identified victim rather than a statistical one. Indeed, they are often disposed to contribute more to rescuing a single identified victim than a greater number of statistical ones. By an “identified victim,” I mean Terry Q., lying injured in the passenger seat of the wrecked automobile on the corner of Main Street and Broadway, or Jessica McClure, the child who fell into the Texas well in (...) 1987 and whose family was sent $700,000 in donations for her. We need not know their names, however, and we can accept a very minimal form of identification. By a “statistical victim,” I mean the person who, extrapolating from traffic records, will be in a similar, serious car accident tomorrow (and may then be identified), or the children who will fall into wells next year if we do not cap them better than we did the well that trapped Jessica. Does this disposition (or perceived obligation) have any normative force? I initially thought there could be no such normative force, but consequentialist and nonconsequentialist arguments, pro and con, have convinced me that reasonable people can disagree with each other. This disagreement poses a problem for political philosophy: how should policy choices take such disagreement into account? (shrink)

Given an abstract logic L = L(Q i ) i ∈ I generated by a set of quantifiers Q i , one can construct for each type τ a topological space S τ exactly as one constructs the Stone space for τ in first-order logic. Letting T be an arbitrary directed set of types, the set $S_T = \{(S_\tau, \pi^\tau_\sigma)\mid\sigma, \tau \in T, \sigma \subset \tau\}$ is an inverse topological system whose bonding mappings π τ σ are naturally determined by (...) the reduct operation on structures. We relate the compactness of L to the topological properties of S T . For example, if I is countable then L is compact iff for every τ each clopen subset of S τ is of finite type and S τ is homeomorphic to $\underset{lim}S_T$ , where T is the set of finite subtypes of τ. We finally apply our results to concrete logics. (shrink)

A dozen philosophers have recently groped for a formula to pick out coercive offers: when P proposes to give a benefit or withhold a harm for Q’s compliance, when does p’s proposal count as coercive? Five formulae are analyzed here. One account is completely “moralized,” claiming that we can’t pick out coercive offers without first settling questions of rights. Two accounts are completely “non-moral,” using as criterion a baseline of “What would in fact have happened” if P had not wanted (...) Q’s compliance. Finally, two accounts offer “two-baseline” accounts, asking “What should have happened?” and/or “What would have happened otherwise?” four accounts are found quite inadequate; the fifth account (my own earlier formula) is threatened by two odd counter cases. Finally, an alternative to “defining coercion” is sketched. (shrink)

A dozen philosophers have recently groped for a formula to pick out coercive offers: when P proposes to give a benefit or withhold a harm for Q’s compliance, when does p’s proposal count as coercive? Five formulae are analyzed here. One account is completely “moralized,” claiming that we can’t pick out coercive offers without first settling questions of rights. Two accounts are completely “non-moral,” using as criterion a baseline of “What would in fact have happened” if P had not wanted (...) Q’s compliance. Finally, two accounts offer “two-baseline” accounts, asking “What should have happened?” and/or “What would have happened otherwise?” four accounts are found quite inadequate; the fifth account (my own earlier formula) is threatened by two odd counter cases. Finally, an alternative to “defining coercion” is sketched. (shrink)

This is a collection of essays by analytic philosophers who examine the sort of argument attributed to Kant in his refutation of Humes skepticism. This sort of argument is called transcendental and has the following structure: p; it would not be possible that p if we did not think that q; therefore we must think that q; therefore it is true that q.. If p stands for thought or experience, then this sort of argument is transcendental in that it argues (...) that something is required for thinking about or experiencing not merely particular things, but for thinking about or experiencing anything at all. The use of transcendental arguments by various figures in the history of philosophy is examined in these essays. However, the authors are primarily concerned with the use of such arguments by various recent analytic philosophers. The essays are written both by defenders of transcendental arguments, who are interested in refuting either Humean or Cartesian skepticism, and by detractors of these arguments. Barry Stroud is the prime example of the latter. Here the main debate concerns whether one can move from some undeniable facts about experience or the psychological realm to some facts about nonpsychological reality. Hence truth-directed transcendental arguments seem more controversial than belief-directed ones. Or again, critics of transcendental arguments very often focus on the legitimacy of drawing conclusions about the nature of reality from premises about the nature of thought. (shrink)

Our purpose is to formulate a complete logic of propositions that takes into account the fact that propositions are both senses provided with truth values and contents of conceptual thoughts. In our formalization, propositions are more complex entities than simple functions from possible worlds into truth values. They have a structure of constituents (a content) in addition to truth conditions. The formalization is adequate for the purposes of the logic of speech acts. It imposes a stronger criterion of propositional identity (...) than strict equivalence. Two propositions P and Q are identical if and only if, for any illocutionary force F, it is not possible to perform with success a speech act of the form F(P) without also performing with success a speech act of the form F(Q). Unlike hyperintensional logic, our logic of propositions is compatible with the classical Boolean laws of propositional identity such as the symmetry and the associativity of conjunction and the reduction of double negation. (shrink)

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein maintains that “The world is all that is the case.” Some philosophers have seen an advantage in introducing into a formal language either a constant which will represent the world, or an operator, e.g., ‘Max’, such that indicates that p gives a complete description of the actual world, of the world at some instant of time, or of a possible world. Such propositions are called world propositions, possible world propositions, or maximal propositions. For us, a maximal (...) proposition is a possible world proposition; it gives a complete description of one way the world might be. A maximal proposition p is not logically false, and for any proposition q, either p entails q or p entails not-q. (shrink)

Background Q-CEP (Qualificação dos Comitês de Ética em Pesquisa que compõem o Sistema CEP/Conep) is a nationwide project resulting from a partnership between the Brazilian National Research Ethics Commission (Conep), the Ministry of Health and Hospital Moinhos de Vento (HMV). It was developed to consolidate policy for ethical review of research with human beings in all members of the CEP/Conep System, Brazil’s national system of institutional review boards. The aim of this study was therefore to report on the experience and (...) results of the Q-CEP project. Methods An observational, retrospective study includes data from the Q-CEP, obtained from visits to all the institutional research ethics committees (RECs) in the country. The actions implemented by Q-CEP were part of a two-step process: (i) training visits to each REC; (ii) development of distance learning modules on strategic topics pertaining to research ethics evaluation. The data presented herein cover step one (training visits), defined by Q-CEP as the diagnostic stage of the project. For a country with social and economics inequalities such as Brazil, this is a particularly important stage; an accurate picture of reality is needed to inform planning of quality improvement strategies. Results In 2019–2021, Q-CEP visited 832 RECs and trained 11,197 people. This sample covered almost all active RECs in the country; only 4 (0.5%) were not evaluated. Of the 94 items evaluated, 62% did not reach the target of at least 80% compliance and around 1/4 (26%) were below 50% compliance. The diagnostic stage of the process revealed inadequacies on the part of the RECs in their ethical reviews. The analysis of informed consent forms showed compliance in only 131 RECs (15.74%). The description of pending issues made by RECs in their reports was compliant in 19.33% (n = 161). Administrative and operational aspects were also considered inadequate by more than half of the RECs. Conclusions Overall, Brazilian RECs showed poor compliance in several aspects of their operation, both in ethics evaluation and in other processes, which justifies additional training. The Q-CEP project is part of a quality improvement policy promoted by the Brazilian Ministry of Health. The data obtained in the diagnostic step of the project have contributed to the qualification and consolidation of one of the world’s largest research ethics evaluation systems. (shrink)

We introduce a family of local ranks $D_Q$ depending on a finite set Q of pairs of the form $(\varphi (x,y),q(y)),$ where $\varphi (x,y)$ is a formula and $q(y)$ is a global type. We prove that in any NSOP $_1$ theory these ranks satisfy some desirable properties; in particular, $D_Q(x=x)<\omega $ for any finite tuple of variables x and any Q, if $q\supseteq p$ is a Kim-forking extension of types, then $D_Q(q) (...) Kim-non-forking extension, then $D_Q(q)=D_Q(p)$ for every Q that involves only invariant types whose Morley powers are -stationary. We give natural examples of families of invariant types satisfying this property in some NSOP $_1$ theories. We also answer a question of Granger about equivalence of dividing and dividing finitely in the theory $T_\infty $ of vector spaces with a generic bilinear form. We conclude that forking equals dividing in $T_\infty $, strengthening an earlier observation that $T_\infty $ satisfies the existence axiom for forking independence. Finally, we slightly modify our definitions and go beyond NSOP $_1$ to find out that our local ranks are bounded by the well-known ranks: the inp-rank (burden), and hence, in particular, by the dp-rank. Therefore, our local ranks are finite provided that the dp-rank is finite, for example, if T is dp-minimal. Hence, our notion of rank identifies a non-trivial class of theories containing all NSOP $_1$ and NTP $_2$ theories. (shrink)

Bayesians take “definite” or “single-case” probabilities to be basic. Definite probabilities attach to closed formulas or propositions. We write them here using small caps: PROB(P) and PROB(P/Q). Most objective probability theories begin instead with “indefinite” or “general” probabilities (sometimes called “statistical probabilities”). Indefinite probabilities attach to open formulas or propositions. We write indefinite probabilities using lower case “prob” and free variables: prob(Bx/Ax). The indefinite probability of an A being a B is not about any particular A, but rather about the (...) property of being an A. In this respect, its logical form is the same as that of relative frequencies. For instance, we might talk about the probability of a human baby being female. That probability is about human babies in general — not about individuals. If we examine a baby and determine conclusively that she is female, then the definite probability of her being female is 1, but that does not alter the indefinite probability of human babies in general being female. Most objective approaches to probability tie probabilities to relative frequencies in some way, and the resulting probabilities have the same logical form as the relative frequencies. That is, they are indefinite probabilities. The simplest theories identify indefinite probabilities with relative frequencies.3 It is often objected that such “finite frequency theories” are inadequate because our probability judgments often diverge from relative frequencies. For example, we can talk about a coin being fair (and so the indefinite probability of a flip landing heads is 0.5) even when it is flipped only once and then destroyed (in which case the relative frequency is either 1 or 0). For understanding such indefinite probabilities, it has been suggested that we need a notion of probability that talks about possible instances of properties as well as actual instances.. (shrink)

We study completely decomposable torsion-free abelian groups of the form $\mathcal{G}_S := \oplus_{n \in S} \mathbb{Q}_{p_n}$ for sets $S \subseteq \omega$. We show that $\mathcal{G}_S$has a decidable copy if and only if S is $\Sigma^0_2$and has a computable copy if and only if S is $\Sigma^0_3$.

This article aims to contextualize a short Qurʾānic passage – Q 30:2‒5 – with reference to Jewish and Christian materials that have not hitherto been deployed for this purpose. The article builds on the findings of recent scholarship, which reads this passage eschatologically rather than historically, and argues that there are, in fact, two texts that require contextualization: 1) The Qurʾānic verses themselves (which refer only to the fate of “the Romans”); and 2) The early exegetical traditions on these verses (...) (which often add “the Persians” to the eschatological drama). Furthermore, it is argued that the Biblical book of Daniel, and its interpretation in late antiquity, contributed both to the verses themselves and to their exegesis. (shrink)

This article seeks to contribute to our understanding of a short Qurʾānic passage, Q 85:4‒10, which concerns the fate of the enigmatic Aṣḥāb al-Ukhdūd. It is argued that the ‘eschatological’ and ‘historical’ readings of this passage, which have generally been taken to be mutually exclusive options for its interpretation, are both indispensable for a full contextualization of the verses in question. Furthermore, regarding the historical reading of the passage, it is argued that the verses refer to the events recorded in (...) Daniel 3, rather than to the Martyrs of Najrān episode that most exegetes (and many modern scholars) opt for. Finally, a new etymology for the word Ukhdūd is proposed. (shrink)

La obra de Nicolás Gómez Dávila ha sido leída presuponiendo su desconexión frente a la producción filosófica local del pasado. Esa presuposición ha pasado por alto la existencia de posibles vínculos entre las tesis de la filosofía del derecho en De iure y la reflexión sobre el lenguaje y la tradición presente en el ensayo de Miguel Antonio Caro titulado “Del uso en sus relaciones con el lenguaje”. Este artículo explora los posibles vínculos entre ambos ensayos, a partir de (i) (...) la similitud entre la concepción horaciana del lenguaje presente en la obra de Caro y las tesis de De iure, (ii) las correspondencias entre los esquemas metodológicos y valorativos, derivados de aquella concepción, presentes en ambas obras, y (iii) las similitudes y diferencias de su conservatismo político. (shrink)

This issue contains a book symposium on Anneli Jefferson’s book, Are mental disorders brain disorders?. It is a delight that the symposium brings together a variety of perspectives from philosopher...

Sustainable Public Food Procurement (SPFP) is gaining recognition for its potential to improve the sustainability of food systems and promote healthier diets. However, SPFP faces various challenges, including coordination issues, actor dynamics, infrastructure limitations, unsustainable habits, and institutional resistance, among others. Drawing upon insights from the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) on socio-technical transitions and the X-curve model on transition dynamics, this study investigates the role of transition intermediaries in facilitating SPFP-induced transformations in food systems. Focusing on four case studies in Spain, (...) we identify common barriers encountered in SPFP and analyse how distinct types of transition intermediaries contribute individually and collectively to address these challenges. Additionally, we explore how intermediary networks evolve throughout different phases of the transition process. Our findings reveal that SPFP barriers are systemic and interconnected, emphasizing the necessity of collective intermediation to overcome these obstacles. Furthermore, our results reveal how collective intermediation is orchestrated by pivotal intermediaries who mobilize diverse transition intermediaries, shaping multiple transition pathways. These intermediaries operate at both food system regimes and niches, challenging the conventional notion that transformative change can only originate from niche efforts. Lastly, we highlight the dynamic and flexible nature of intermediation in SPFP transitions, underscoring the importance of adaptability in strategies as these transitions evolve over time. Practical implications include the need for context-specific, adaptive approaches and strategies that leverage intermediary diversity. This research offers insights for policymakers, practitioners, and scholars into SPFP and broader transitions towards food systems transformation, fostering a more comprehensive understanding of these transition processes. (shrink)

Many philosophers hold that a general norm of truth governs the attitude of believing. In a recent and influential discussion, Krister Bykvist and Anandi Hattiangadi raise a number of serious objections to this view. In this paper, I concede that Bykvist and Hattiangadi's criticisms might be effective against the formulation of the norm of truth that they consider, but suggest that an alternative is available. After outlining that alternative, I argue that it is not vulnerable to objections parallel to those (...) Bykvist and Hattiangadi advance, although it might initially appear to be. In closing, I consider what bearing the preceding discussion has on important questions concerning the natures of believing and of truth. (shrink)

Based on a creative use of the phenomenological method, we argue that a close examination of the temporality of objects reveals the future as genuinely open. Without aiming to decide the matter of phenomenological realism, we suggest that this method can be used to investigate the mode of being of objects in their own temporality. By bracketing the anticipatory structure of experience, one can get a sense of objects’ temporality as independent of consciousness. This contributes to the current Realism versus (...) Idealism debates, but it does so without taking sides. The starting point is neither an analysis of pure consciousness, nor attempts to describe objects in-themselves, but the idea that things can be phenomenologically grasped through the difference between their temporality and our own. By being methodically “open to the future,” one can become aware of the sui generis temporality of objects as different from the temporality shaped by our anticipation. (shrink)

Although in theory social justice is considered as a core dimension of agroecological transitions, alternative food initiatives related to agroecology have been criticised for their exclusionary practices based on important social and economic biases. In this article, we adopt the lens of political intersectionality to study two cases of Agroecology-oriented Food Redistribution Coalitions in Spain that emerged to address the rising levels of food insecurity during the COVID-19 pandemic. We find that the coalitions represent a convergence of diverse social struggles, (...) placing intersectionally marginalized groups at the centre of their activism. However, we also uncover that coalition members participate in different ways depending on their socioeconomic profiles, which could perpetuate inequalities in organizational practices. One major point of tension is the need to balance the goal of providing access to healthy and sustainable food with the affordability of such produce. This leads to the adoption of hybrid food networks that include conventionally produced food. We also highlight that while the predominance of women in these coalitions reflects the unequal distribution of food-related care work in society, the collectivization of such work through AFRCs practices points to a transformation of gender relations. Territorialized alliances between actors from urban and rural settings and between urban centers and peripheries are established through the coalitions. However, such networks fall short on involving large numbers of agroecology-oriented initiatives and providing direct encounters between consumers and producers. Overall, the article underscores the importance of addressing intersecting inequalities within alternative food initiatives and argues that intersectional coalitions offer an intriguing example of how to promote such understanding and pave the way towards (more) just agroecological transitions. (shrink)

Participants watched themselves in a mirror while another person behind them, hidden from view, extended hands forward on each side where participants’ hands would normally appear. The hands performed a series of movements. When participants could hear instructions previewing each movement, they reported an enhanced feeling of controlling the hands. Hearing instructions for the movements also enhanced skin conductance responses when a rubber band was snapped on the other’s wrist after the movements. Such vicarious agency was not felt when the (...) instructions followed the movements, and participants’ own covert movement mimicry was not essential to the influence of previews on reported control. (shrink)

In recent years, the psychological causes and consequences of poverty have received renewed attention from scientists and policymakers. In this essay, we summarize new developments in this literature. First, we discuss advances in our understanding of the relationship between income and psychological well-being. There is a robust positive relationship between the two, both within and across countries, and in correlational and causal analyses. Second, we summarize recent work on the impact of “scarcity” and stress on economic preferences and decision-making. Our (...) view of this literature is that the evidence is relatively weak. Third, we summarize evidence on the impact of psychological interventions on economic outcomes. Light-touch psychological interventions, such as videos that aim to raise aspirations, have shown some promise in encouraging investment and improving economic well-being. Similarly, psychotherapy and pharmacological mental health treatments have positive effects on economic outcomes. Relative to the effects of cash transfers, these impacts are small in absolute terms and large in per-dollar terms. We conclude by discussing whether a psychological poverty trap is plausible. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 25-49 [Access article in PDF] Descartes's Nomic Concurrentism:Finite Causation and Divine Concurrence Andrew Pessin DESCARTES APPEARS TO HOLD the traditional view that God acts in the world via willing. 1 In recent papers on his successor Malebranche, who also holds that view, I have argued that since volitions are paradigm representational states, close attention to the representational content of God's volitions (...) has substantial exegetical rewards. 2 The same, I will argue, is true regarding Descartes. In particular, due to lack of such attention, scholars have largely failed to realize that Descartes retains [End Page 25] a version of the scholastic doctrine that God ordinarily concurs with the causal activities of both mental and material finite substances ("concurrentism"). 3 Since concurrentism implies the true causal powers of those finite substances, in exposing Descartes's adherence to it I aim to open up new ways of thinking about some old problems in Cartesian exegesis.The plan:(I) I will first sketch a partial "worldview," along with evidence that Descartes held something like it, then(II) argue, both on the basis of this worldview and other evidence, that we should interpret Descartes's account of divine and finite causality as a version of concurrentism, then(III) show how interpreting Descartes this way has significant implications for understanding his views on the causal powers of both mental and material finite substances, and finally(IV) contrast my interpretation with two recent relevant ones: Kenneth Clatterbaugh's and Daniel Garber's. 1. A Partial Worldview If Descartes's God acts on the world via willing, we may inquire into the contents of those volitions. I suggest that Descartes's God has, among others, distinguishable volitions with roughly the following contents. 4 These constitute a partial worldview (W), and will be discussed in turn:(V1) At all times beginning with original Creation matter exists everywhere.(V2) There is at original Creation a particular quantity q and particular distribution d of motion.(V3) At all times, the laws of motion apply.(V4) Mind m exists at time t (appropriately substituted).(V5) At all times, the laws of mind-body union apply.Our first task is to accommodate God's role in the Cartesian system as the continuous conserver of the material world. 5 One divine volition which would accomplish that might have the content, not that each individual body persists, but rather, simply, that [End Page 26](V1) at all times beginning with original Creation matter exists everywhere. 6Now (V1) may require us to rethink the way continuous conservation arguments are typically framed. In the texts of La Forge and Malebranche, for example, what God conserves are individual bodies,and Cartesian texts seem sometimes to suggest the same. 7 Such framing might suggest, contra (V1), that God's conservational volitional contents make explicit reference to each individual body. Nevertheless, there are reasons to think that Descartes's God's conserving activity is and ought to be framed as in (V1):(i) God's willing that (V1) provides an easy way to reconcile Cartesian mind —> body causal interaction with continuous conservation. 8 Many think that there is a tension between these two doctrines, since God, in conserving bodies, would seem to be responsible for all their modes including motion, leaving nothing for minds to contribute to them. Now that might be true where God's conserving volition explicitly represents each individual body, particularly given the role that motion plays in distinguishing individual Cartesian bodies. 9 (V1), however, in making no reference to individual bodies, is perfectly consistent with minds affecting either the quantity or distribution of motion in the material world.(ii) Similarly in Physiologia, Des Chene convincingly defends the claim that for Descartes, "since the existence of motion... is not entailed by the existence of matter, the creation of motion [is] independent of the creation of matter" (329). In light, again, of Descartes's conception of individual bodies (n. 9, below), this independence is best modeled by distinguishing God's conserving volition from those volitions... (shrink)

La flexibilidad y la mercantilización de lo espiritual ¿son aspectos característicos de la cultura contemporánea? Centrado en los casos de Alemania, Inglaterra y Francia, el artículo detalla cómo el romanticismo literario se articula como un movimiento pionero de la espiritualidad flexible, proceso que se entrelaza con su rol seminal en la formación del campo literario moderno. El crecimiento económico y demográfico sostenidos en Europa desde el s. XV, así como la alfabetización impulsada por el protestantismo, construyen un moderno público lector (...) que da pie —durante el s. XVIII— a la revolución y diversificación de la lectura, lo que promueve la difusión de incipientes tendencias modernas (ciencia, Ilustración, prensa). Oponiéndose parcialmente a estas tendencias y extendiendo la diversificación de lo impreso, surge la tendencia romántica. Sus autores flexibilizan la espiritualidad más allá de las convenciones religiosas de la época —y aportan a la formación del campo literario— (1) caracterizando el desencanto y otras formas de malestar moderno; (2) multiplicando el lenguaje imaginario-trascendente; (3) brindando connotaciones metafísicas al genio artístico; (4) promoviendo la autonomía y libertad expresiva del arte. La evidencia indica que el mercado fue una condición histórica básica para la EF. Se sugiere que esta flexibilidad se muestra como una adaptación de la espiritualidad a las circunstancias empíricas de la modernidad, la cual conlleva nuevas necesidades de sentido y una mayor capacidad para divergir de los relatos religiosos tradicionales. (shrink)

Given the abrupt global disruption caused by SARS-CoV-2, one might think that the COVID pandemic was an unpredictable event. But in the years leading up to the emergence of the COVID pandemic, several documents had already been warning of the increasing occurrences of new disease outbreaks with pandemic potential and lack of corresponding policies to promote pandemic preparedness and response. In this article, we call these documents “early warnings”. We argue that a survey of early warnings can help science communicators (...) to promote the public understanding of evidence-based pandemic preparedness and response policies at local or international level. Our proposal differs from other approaches to pandemic preparedness and response in that it highlights the relevance of documents published before the COVID outbreak. We show that the early warnings did not become outdated after the COVID outbreak, but, rather, that they are even more pressing now. (shrink)

We present numerous natural algebraic examples without the so-called Canonical Base Property (CBP). We prove that every commutative unitary ring of finite Morley rank without finite-index proper ideals satisfies the CBP if and only if it is a field, a ring of positive characteristic or a finite direct product of these. In addition, we construct a CM-trivial commutative local ring with a finite residue field without the CBP. Furthermore, we also show that finite-dimensional non-associative algebras over an algebraically closed field (...) of characteristic [Formula: see text] give rise to triangular rings without the CBP. This also applies to Baudisch’s [Formula: see text]-step nilpotent Lie algebras, which yields the existence of a [Formula: see text]-step nilpotent group of finite Morley rank whose theory, in the pure language of groups, is CM-trivial and does not satisfy the CBP. (shrink)

This article argues that Ursula Le Guin’s science fiction is a form of ‘speculative anthropology’ that reconciles thick description and historicity. Like Clifford Geertz’s ethnographic writings, Le Guin’s science fiction utilises thick description to place the reader within unfamiliar social worlds rendered with extraordinary phenomenological fluency. At the same time, by incorporating social antagonisms, cultural contestation, and historical contingency, Le Guin never allows thick description to neutralise historicity. Rather, by combining the two and exploring their interplay, Le Guin establishes a (...) critical relation between her imagined worlds and the reader’s own historical moment. This enables her to both counter Fredric Jameson’s influential criticism of her work – the charge of ‘world reduction’ – and point to ungrasped utopian possibilities within the present. Le Guin’s speculative anthropology thus combines the strengths while overcoming some of the limitations of both Geertz’s thick-descriptive method and Jameson’s theory of the science fiction genre. (shrink)

In Lukács: Praxis and the Absolute, Daniel Andrés López reassembles Lukács’s philosophy of praxis on a Hegelian basis, as a conceptual-historical totality, both defending him and proposing an unprecedented, immanent critique that raises problems for Marxian philosophy as a whole.